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NHTSA UP IN THE CLOUDS:
THE FORMAL RECALL PROCESS & OVERTHE-AIR SOFTWARE UPDATES
Emma Himes *

Abstract
Software updates are pushed to vehicles “over-the-air” (OTA)
with increasing frequency as they reduce costs of visiting dealerships
and auto shops to receive maintenance. These updates, pushed from
the cloud, have been used to remedy safety defects in vehicles and
improve software controlling all aspects of vehicles from steering to
rearview mirrors. Remedies of vehicle safety defects are overseen by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA);
however, because many OTA software updates do not remedy issues
officially deemed safety defects, they are pushed straight from the
manufacturer to drivers with little government oversight or
transparency. NHTSA’s recall process was designed in 1966 to remedy
safety defects in vehicles, resulting in a process which is now outdated
for modern vehicles running on software. NHTSA has acknowledged
the increased use of OTA software updates and prescribed OTA
remedies for safety defects, but the current framework leaves NHTSA
unable to oversee the rapid output of OTA software updates pushed by
auto manufacturers. Without updating the current recall process for
software related updates to vehicles, and specifically over-the-air
software updates, NHTSA’s ability to oversee vehicle safety may
decrease and the recall process may grow obsolete as the issues facing
vehicles today have changed since Congress defined what constitutes a
safety defect.

*
J.D. Candidate, Class of 2022, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to
thank Professor Emily Frascaroli for introducing me to this topic in the course Legal Issues
Surrounding Autonomous Vehicles. I would also like to thank the MTLR team for their
thoughtful edits.
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Introduction
Today, the majority of new cars on the road are controlled by software
instead of mechanical parts as a result of vehicles becoming “smarter.” As
the number of lines of code within a single vehicle continues to increase,
1
there has also been an increase in software related recalls of vehicles. Overthe-air (“OTA”) software updates have become a common avenue to
remedy software related safety defects within the formal recall process
overseen by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(“NHTSA”) due to the lower cost and greater ease of OTA updates.
However, OTA software updates do not fit well within the established recall
framework, increasing the need for a new recall process which delivers
remedies for modern, connected, automated, and autonomous vehicles.
Part I of this note describes NHTSA’s current recall process and how it
is unable to address software or cybersecurity related safety issues. Part II
describes how NHTSA has addressed OTA software updates. Part III
describes the increase in OTA software updates and the speed at which
manufacturers are releasing software updates. Part IV proposes that NHTSA
create a standardized and transparent approach for OTA software updates by
modifying the recall process to specifically address remedies for software
related safety issues and to create a database documenting all over-the-air
1.
Albert Lilly, The Current State of Automotive Software Related Recalls, SIBROS
(Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.sibros.tech/post/the-current-state-of-automotive-softwarerelated-recalls (citing a “sharp rise in the volume of software related recalls” in the United
States according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Association’s recall database, with
recalls tripling between 2009 and 2019).
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updates pushed to vehicles. This note concludes by reiterating that the recall
process must adapt to increase transparency from manufacturers and enable
NHTSA’s recall process to fit vehicles of the present and future.

I. NHTSA Recall Policy
NHTSA, which is part of the Department of Transportation (“DOT”), is
the agency responsible for “delivering vehicle safety standards,” “notifying
automobile manufacturers that have safety associated issues, or do not
satisfy the Federal safety standards,” and “supervising the manufacturer’s
remedial action to guarantee that the recall drive process has been
2
completed successfully.” A recall is issued when NHTSA determines that a
vehicle creates an unreasonable safety risk, fails to meet minimum safety
3
standards, or the manufacturer discovers a safety defect. If a defect is
discovered, the manufacturer must notify NHTSA, vehicle or equipment
owners, dealers, and distributors by first-class mail and remedy the problem
4
within a reasonable time.
The current recall process, codified in the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118-30120 (hereinafter the “Safety
Act”), was passed in 1966 to create and administer new safety standards for
5
motor vehicles and road traffic safety. The Safety Act, signed by President
Lyndon Johnson, answered a national cry in response to Ralph Nader’s
book Unsafe At Any Speed, which accused Chevrolet of cutting costs at the
risk of driver safety by building the engine into the back of the Chevy
6
Corvair. While the Safety Act created a recall process which protected
consumers from vehicles like the Corvair, the recall process must now adapt
to increase transparency and oversight of OTA software updates for modern
vehicles.
In 2000, the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and
Documentation (“TREAD”) Act was passed to enhance the existing recall
7
policy. It requires “vehicle and equipment manufacturers to report
periodically to NHTSA on a wide variety of information that could indicate
2.
Subir Halder, Amrita Ghosal & Mauro Conti, Secure OTA Software Updates in
Connected Vehicles: A Survey, COMPUT. NETWORKS, June 2020, at 1, 6,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128619314963.
3.
Safety Issues & Recalls, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/recalls (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
4.
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY DEFECTS AND
RECALLS: WHAT EVERY VEHICLE OWNER SHOULD KNOW 1, 11 (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites
/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/14218-mvsdefectsandrecalls_041619-v2-tag.pdf.
5.
National Traffic and Motor Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118–30120 (2012).
6.
Christopher Jensen, 50 Years Ago, ‘Unsafe at Any Speed’ Shook the Auto World, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/automobiles/50-years-ago-unsafe-atany-speed-shook-the-auto-world.html.
7.
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD)
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000).
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the existence of a potential safety defect and to advise NHTSA of foreign
8
safety recalls and other safety campaigns.” While this act serves goals of
transparency and functionality broadly, this most recent language update to
the recall process does not address software defects, cybersecurity issues, or
OTA remedies.

A. An Antiquated Recall Process
When the drafters of the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966
designed the recall process, they addressed specific concerns related to
physical parts of cars like construction, components, and materials that
9
could contribute to causing a deadly accident. The Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards often focus on brakes, tires, lighting, air bags, seat belts,
car seats and booster seats, energy absorbing steering columns, and
10
motorcycle helmets. Today, software impacts many of these components
in vehicles, requiring an adapted recall process.
Each OTA software update pushed to a vehicle makes some change to
11
the millions of lines of code in a vehicle. Improvements include updates
varying from improvements to assisted driving software or the functionality
12
of a vehicle’s display screen impacting rearview mirrors and cameras.
13
Updates may also patch a security vulnerability. While all updates are
pushed by manufacturers with the intention of improving a vehicle, an
update may leave a bug in the vehicle’s software that did not exist at the
time of sale or prior to an OTA software update. A bug may be minor and
have no effect on the operation of the vehicle, but there is also a possibility
that an OTA update could create a safety defect that was not previously
present in the vehicle. The OTA update could also make the vehicle
vulnerable to a new cybersecurity risk. The risk of a safety or security issue
being created by an OTA update increases as the quantity of updates being
pushed increases, because there is less time spent testing each update for

8.
The Implementation of the TREAD Act: One Year Later: Hearing on H.R. 5164
Before the Subcomm. on Com., Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com.,
107th Cong. 13 (2002) (statement of Honorable Jeffery W. Runge, M.D., Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
9.
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 4, at 2.
10.
See id.
11.
Omkar Panse, The Changing Landscape for Over-the-Air (OTA) Updates, KPIT
https://www.kpit.com/insights/changing-landscape-for-over-the-air-ota-updates (last visited
Nov. 24, 2021).
12.
Statement by American Honda Regarding Four Automobile Recalls, HONDA
NEWS (Aug. 4, 2020), https://hondanews.com/en-US/honda-corporate/releases/release6f203606fa66618d91f0658cf700277c-statement-by-american-honda-regarding-fourautomobile-recalls.
13.
John Tuttle, Protecting Connected Cars’ Over-the-Air Software Updates,
WARDSAUTO (July 21, 2020), https://www.wardsauto.com/vehicles/protecting-connectedcars-over-air-software-updates.
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security vulnerabilities or impacts on the vehicle’s software as a whole.
Hundreds of OTA updates are being pushed by automotive companies per
year, and some of the updates are pushed only days after identifying a
14
problem. For example, Tesla pushed an OTA update within days of
Consumer Reports reporting an overly long stopping distance in 2018,
15
reducing the braking distance by 20 feet. The OTA update was pushed so
recently after discovery of the problem that some doubted the thoroughness
16
of testing the new software.
Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey stated in 2020 that NHTSA is
“neglecting to oversee and keep the public informed about over-the-air
(OTA) software updates designed to fix safety defects in cars without a
17
physical recall.” In response to criticism, NHTSA updated their
Cybersecurity Practices for the Safety of Modern Vehicles, creating a legal
18
basis for OTA software updates to on-board vehicle software. Section 9.8
relating to OTA software updates states:
Manufacturers that design-in and offer OTA software update
capability on their vehicles should:
[T.22] Maintain the integrity of OTA updates, update servers,
the transmission mechanism and the updating process in
general.
[T.23] Take into account, when designing security measures,
the risks associated with compromised servers, insider threats,
19
men-in-the-middle attacks, and protocol vulnerabilities.
While this official acknowledgement of OTA updates by NHTSA is a step
in the right direction, the recommendation does little where many, if not all,
manufacturers already make efforts to maintain the integrity of OTA
20
updates and account for cybersecurity risks. Nor do the practices explain
14.
See Kristof Horvath, How Over-The-Air Updates Are Turning the Auto Industry Upside
Down, INTLAND SOFTWARE (Oct. 20, 2020), https://content.intland.com/blog/how-over-the-airupdates-are-turning-the-auto-industry-upside-down.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Senators Markey & Blumenthal Demand NHTSA Proactively Address the Cyber Risks of
Internet-Connected Cars, ED MARKEY U.S. SENATOR FOR MASS. (June 11, 2020),
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-markey-and-blumenthal-demandnhtsa-proactively-address-the-cyber-risks-of-internet-connected-cars.
18.
Ericka Pingol, NHTSA: Cybersecurity Best Practice of Modern Vehicles, TREND
MICRO (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.trendmicro.com/us/iot-security/news/6643.
19.
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES FOR
THE SAFETY OF MODERN VEHICLES 17 (2020), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files
/documents/vehicle_cybersecurity_best_practices_01072021.pdf.
20.
See generally Scooter Doll, Over-the-Air Updates: How Does Each EV Automaker Compare?,
ELECTREK (Oct. 1, 2021, 1:00 AM), https://electrek.co/2021/10/01/over-the-air-updates-how-does-each-ev-
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how NHTSA monitors and responds to OTA software updates for connected
cars. NHTSA’s response is insufficient in light of robust changes in the
automotive space.
Software-related safety defects will become increasingly important as
cars become smarter, which will require automotive original equipment
manufacturers (“OEMs”) to push OTA software updates to fix software
glitches and security vulnerabilities. NHTSA’s recall process is lacking a
toolkit to both identify and remedy software related issues and safety
defects in vehicles. In order to improve consumer transparency regarding
safety related software updates to vehicles and avoid the delays of the
traditional recall process, the regulatory framework for automotive recalls
must acknowledge and adapt to allow for greater efficiency and
transparency in safety remedies. This note proposes that NHTSA
standardize the OTA process by requiring reporting of OTA updates pushed
to vehicles and creating a database documenting those updates. This will aid
NHTSA in ensuring consumers are protected as the number of vehicles with
OTA capabilities on the road increases. A database of updates may also
incentivize manufacturers to complete more thorough testing of updates
prior to pushing them to drivers.
Further, connecting vehicles to the cloud introduces cybersecurity risks
which must be addressed by NHTSA, especially in relation to OTA updates.
NHTSA policies and rules must address the concern that “internetconnected vehicles can potentially be hacked and remotely controlled by
malicious actors, creating risks not only to the lives of car drivers and
21
passengers, but also to pedestrians and property along the road.” NHTSA’s
recall framework for internet-connected cars must include the infrastructure
to responds to OTA cybersecurity risks.

1. Are Software Glitches Safety Defects?
One of the most critical problems with using the 1966 recall policy for
OTA updates is that many software related issues are not officially deemed
“safety defects” under the Safety Act. For example, in 2019 a Tesla driver
fatally crashed into the side of a truck while the Tesla’s semiautonomous
22
Autopilot technology was engaged. Following investigations by both
NHTSA and Tesla, Tesla vehicles on the road received an OTA software
automaker-compare/#h-over-the-air-capabilities-by-ev-manufacturer (explaining how manufacturers are
using OTA updates in order to keep vehicle software up to date, including manufacturers Audi, BMW, Fiat
Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar/Land Rover, Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, Porsche,
Tesla, Toyota, Volkswagen, and Volvo).
21.
See Senators Markey & Blumenthal Demand NHTSA Proactively Address the Cyber
Risks of Internet-Connected Cars, supra note 17.
22.
Katie Burke, Over-the-Air Updates May Alter NHTSA Recall Policy, AUTO. NEWS (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.autonews.com/article/20170123/OEM11/301239815/over-the-air-updates-may-alternhtsa-recall-policy.
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update which forces drivers to keep their hands on the wheel the majority of
the time while driving in an attempt to eliminate the cause of the deadly
23
crash. This OTA software update, which “included increased use of radar
sensors and a ‘strike out’ feature that would disable Autopilot if drivers took
their hands off the wheel too many times,” occurred outside of the
traditional recall process as no safety defect was found by NHTSA’s Office
24
of Defects Investigation (“ODA”). Had NHTSA’s ODA identified a defect
in the software, NHTSA’s spokesman Bryan Thomas stated that Tesla
would have been required to follow the recall process prior to pushing an
25
OTA software update. Regardless, the current recall framework does not
speak to OTA software updates for safety defects or other safety issues in
software which are not officially deemed “safety defects” yet pose a fatal
risk.
Since this fatal occurrence, NHTSA has slowly began making progress
in the realm of OTA updates. In 2021, NHTSA published multiple recall
announcements allowing for defects to be remedied by OTA software
updates, which has been deemed as setting a “new precedent for what
26
constitutes an automotive recall.” However, NHTSA overstates the
effectiveness of the antiquated recall policy in monitoring software related
safety risks and documenting OTA updates.
The formal recall process fails to fit modern vehicles and remedies. For
example, in 2020, Tesla pushed an OTA update to recalled Model Y
27
vehicles to remedy a trailer brake light failure caused by a software error.
This was deemed a safety defect as Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
number 108, “Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment,”
28
requires illumination of trailer brake lights. Tesla remedied the firmware
with an OTA update available on September 23, 2020, and followed the
requirements of the formal recall process, including mailing owner
29
notification letters in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 577.7.
Comparing these two Tesla cases, a fatal Autopilot crash which was not
deemed a safety defect and a brake light failure which was deemed a safety
defect, reveals that the current recall process is inadequately designed for
vehicles running on software and connected to the internet, even where a
software design results in a fatality. In September 2021, NHTSA began
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Alex Brisbourne, Tesla’s Over-the-Air Fix: Best Example Yet of the Internet of
Things?, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/02/teslas-air-fix-best-example-yet-internetthings (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
27.
Fred Lambert, Tesla Issues Model Y Recall Over Trailer Brake Light Failure, But the Fix
Is an OTA Software Update, ELECTREK (Oct. 19, 2020, 4:18 PM), https://electrek.co/2020/10/19
/tesla-issues-model-y-recall-trailer-brake-light-failure-ota-software-update.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
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investigating an OTA update pushed to Tesla vehicles which contained an
30
improvement to the vehicle’s Emergency Light Detection system. Tesla
did not file a recall notice with NHTSA, and NHTSA contacted Tesla’s
Director of Field Quality reiterating that “[a]ny manufacturer issuing an
over-the-air update that mitigates a defect that poses an unreasonable risk to
motor vehicle safety is required to timely file an accompanying recall notice
31
to NHTSA.” If NHTSA determines that there was a safety defect and
announces a recall, this may demonstrate that NHTSA is trying to adapt the
current recall framework for software issues and OTA updates in addition to
demonstrating that they will hold manufacturers pushing OTA updates
accountable.

2. Are Cybersecurity Failures Safety Defects?
What NHTSA deems officially a “safety defect” differs from what a
consumer or manufacturer may consider unsafe. For example, a hacked
vehicle may be found to have no safety defect while objectively posing a
safety risk to the public. In 2015, a group of researchers “commandeered a
Jeep Cherokee’s engine and brakes remotely from a laptop” to spotlight the
32
hacking vulnerabilities of connected cars. This event generated fear, but
auto manufacturers responded by differentiating this event from that of a
33
safety defect. In fact, Mitch Bainwol, head of the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers which represents a dozen auto companies including both
General Motors and Toyota said, “[w]e would reject a blanket assertion that
a cyber risk is a defect . . . . There is a difference between a routine function
34
of a vehicle where a problem arises and the intervention of a bad actor.”
Senator Ed Markey disagreed, stating that “[a] cybersecurity vulnerability is
a safety defect in the same way an exploding air bag or a malfunctioning
35
ignition switch is a safety defect.”
In light of the Jeep hijacking, auto manufacturers with similar security
vulnerabilities to Jeep, including Fiat Chrysler, released software updates
36
blocking commands from unauthorized hackers. Fiat Chrysler asserted that
the security gap was not a defect, but NHTSA responded in a letter that the
37
gap was “a defect causing an unreasonable safety risk.” Regardless,

30.
Rob Stumpf, Feds Order Tesla to Justify OTA Autopilot Updates Instead of
Recalling Cars, DRIVE (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.thedrive.com/tech/42736/feds-ordertesla-to-justify-ota-updates-instead-of-recalling-cars.
31.
Id.
32.
Mike Spector, Is a Hacked Vehicle Also Defective?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-a-hacked-vehicle-also-defective-1440457334.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
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NHTSA never issued a formal classification of the problem as a safety
38
defect, leaving open the question of whether a cybersecurity hack may
officially be deemed a “safety defect.”
Under the Safety Act, for NHTSA to challenge Fiat Chrysler’s
assertion, NHTSA “would need to show a vehicle’s cybersecurity
vulnerability made it far more susceptible to hacking than other cars,”
39
explained a former senior NHTSA enforcement lawyer Allan Kam. Not
only may it be difficult to prove that the cybersecurity of a vehicle is
sufficiently lacking compared to other vehicles, but the process of proving
40
so may also “alert [an] otherwise unaware hacker” to a cybersecurity gap.
41
However, a “quick over-the-air fix could ameliorate that risk.” Based upon
this reasoning, OTA updates are the best way to quickly fix cybersecurity
risks, yet they are not adequately overseen by the NHTSA recall framework.
Instead of taking steps to adapt the recall framework, NHTSA instead
pushed responsibility to drivers to protect themselves from cyber threats. On
March 17, 2016, NHTSA released a Public Service Announcement stating
that “not all hacking incidents may result in a risk to safety” and advised
drivers, not manufacturers, to take precautions such as keeping software up
42
to date and using caution when connecting third-party devices. This PSA
assumes that drivers stay up to date with NHTSA communications, when
manufacturers and dealers would likely better convey this information.
Additionally, this shifts the burden to drivers when the agency,
manufacturers, and dealers are likely to have a more comprehensive
understanding of the vehicles, safety issues, and software updates.
Despite this warning to drivers, NHTSA has made efforts to increase
the cybersecurity of connected vehicles. In April 2016, NHTSA published a
bulletin identifying best practices for ensuring that car manufacturers of
emerging technologies comply with the Safety Act and explaining that
NHTSA will weigh the following factors when determining whether a
cybersecurity vulnerability poses an unreasonable risk to safety:
(i) The amount of time elapsed since the vulnerability was
discovered (e.g., less than one day, three months, or more than
six months);

38.
Id. (explaining that Fiat Chrysler agreed to recall the vehicle while asserting that
the cyber risk is not a safety defect, to which NHTSA disagreed in a letter but never required
Fiat Chrysler to “classify the problem as a defect”).
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ALERT NO. I-031716-PSA, PUBLIC SERVICE
ANNOUNCEMENT: MOTOR VEHICLES INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO REMOTE EXPLOITS
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2016/PSA160317.
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(ii) the level of expertise needed to exploit the vulnerability (e.g.,
whether a layman can exploit the vulnerability or whether it
takes experts to do so);
(iii) the accessibility of knowledge of the underlying system (e.g.,
whether how the system works is public knowledge or whether
it is sensitive and restricted);
(iv) the necessary window of opportunity to exploit the
vulnerability (e.g., an unlimited window or a verry narrow
window); and,
(v) the level of equipment needed to exploit the vulnerability (e.g.,
43
standard or highly specialized).
The bulletin also explains that “NHTSA may increase the weight it gives to
the probability of an attack when there are confirmed incidents of the
vulnerability being exploited in a malicious cybersecurity attack” and that a
recall may be compelling when a vulnerability is identified in a “vehicle’s
entry points (e.g., Wi-Fi, infotainment systems, the OBD-II port) that allow
44
remote access to critical safety systems.” Similar to software glitches,
cybersecurity risks will rarely be deemed as safety defects based upon this
criteria. This results in limited government oversight of vehicle software
and cybersecurity by creating a recall infrastructure that does not adequately
fit modern, connected vehicles.
In recent years, NHTSA has focused much of its research on
cybersecurity and directed energy towards the formation of the Automotive
Information Sharing & Analysis Center (“Auto-ISAC”), which emphasizes
“cybersecurity awareness and collaboration across the automotive
45
industry.” NHTSA approaches cybersecurity with goals to expand
cybersecurity knowledge, support the automotive industry in setting
voluntary standards, fostering new system solutions, and determining the
feasibility of developing performance evaluation methods for automotive
46
cybersecurity. While allowing manufacturers to voluntarily set standards is
likely sufficient where manufacturers have the knowledge and incentives to

43.
Request for Public Comments on NHTSA Enforcement Guidance Bulletin 2016-02: Safety
Related Defects and Emerging Automotive Technologies, 81 Fed. Reg. 18935, 18938 (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/01/2016-07353/request-for-public-comments-onnhtsa-enforcement-guidance-bulletin-2016-02-safety-related-defects.
44.
NHTSA Addresses Hacking and Cybersecurity, CROWELL & MORING LLP
(June 1, 2016), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/NHTSAAddresses-Hacking-and-Cybersecurity.
45.
Vehicle Cybersecurity, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://
www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/vehicle-cybersecurity (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
46.
Id.
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protect their technology, it also shields manufacturers from liability when
cybersecurity goes awry and limits consumer and government oversight of
47
vehicle safety.

B. A Need for Increased Transparency in Over-the-Air Software
Updates
In many ways, the mechanical failures of the past are being replaced by
opaque software issues. In order to gain a better view of the algorithms
controlling vehicles, it has been suggested that NHTSA’s authority to recall
autonomous vehicles (“AVs”) “‘would [be] enhance[d]’ by the statutory
provision requiring manufacturers to submit safety evaluation reports” as
stated by a Senate Committee Report regarding the American Vision For
Safer Transportation Through Advancement of Revolutionary Technologies
48
Act (“AV START Act”). However, by the time a report would be
submitted to NHTSA, some if not many manufacturers would likely have
already pushed an update to remedy any safety issue previously identified in
a connected, automated, or autonomous vehicle, especially considering that
49
manufacturers have pushed updates within days of identifying a problem.
Additionally, in the case of a cybersecurity gap in software, a public report
50
can alert an otherwise unaware hacker of a vulnerability. For these
reasons, it is necessary to create an infrastructure for software updates that
is more efficient than the traditional recall process and asks manufacturers
to be transparent about their frequent safety improvements to opaque
operating systems.
A proactive recall policy would give NHTSA a better view into an
automotive company’s awareness of their own software. Instead of
manufacturers submitting safety evaluation reports as the Senate Committee
Report suggested, NHTSA should reform their recall process to specify how
software related safety defects, software updates for non-safety purposes,
performance updates, and cybersecurity updates will be treated by setting a
standard for OTA technology platforms and creating a transparent database
of updates. NHTSA could achieve this by creating a database similar to
51
their current recall database. The database would contain information
about software and cybersecurity issues that impact consumer safety but do

47.
For example, in September 2021 Tesla pushed an OTA update impacting
automated driving software after various accidents were reported with emergency vehicles,
demonstrating Tesla’s self-regulation. However, Tesla did not provide notice to NHTSA or
officially deem the issue a safety defect, shielding itself from liability and oversight. Stumpf,
supra note 30.
48.
Mark A. Geistfeld, The Regulatory Sweet Spot for Autonomous Vehicles, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 337, 345 (2018) (alteration in the original).
49.
Horvath, supra note 14.
50.
Spector, supra note 32.
51.
See Safety Issues & Recalls, supra note 3.
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not meet the definition of “safety defects” under the Safety Act and provide
a link to the recall database when OTA updates are available for issues
deemed “safety defects.”
The OTA database could provide a transparent, organized system for
manufacturers to log each OTA software update pushed to vehicles on the
road, not only allowing NHTSA to better understand the current state of
vehicle safety but also to enable consumers to review what updates or
software patches their vehicle has undergone. This would also improve
transparency as vehicle software grows more complex.
While an OTA database would improve transparency for the
government and consumers, automotive manufacturers will likely be
hesitant to provide NHTSA with information about any and all safety issues
that require updates, fearful that a NHTSA investigation could be opened
52
resulting in a high price tag and millions of recalled vehicles. Although a
database of OTA updates may seem invasive to some manufacturers, it
could greatly increase trust and transparency and aid efforts to put AVs on
the road. This proposed database would likely be more intrusive to
companies such as Tesla, that act more like software companies by quickly
pushing out updates, than many OEMs which follow a more extended,
53
thorough update process. In order to have the highest engagement from
auto manufacturers, an OTA database which shares many of the privacy
54
principles and collaboration goals of Auto-ISAC would be ideal.

II. NHTSA & Over-The-Air Software Updates
NHTSA has prescribed OTA software updates as remedies in their past
55
recall reports and created a legal basis for OTA software updates, but has
yet to reform the recall infrastructure in a meaningful way that incorporates
OTA updates. An industry-wide standard for components and operating
system (“OS”) configurations could minimize complexity and maximize
efficiency of delivering safety updates to vehicles over-the-air, while also
prescribing minimums for evaluating the cybersecurity of connected
52.
See Keith Barry, Car Recall Guide: Your Questions Answered, CONSUMER REPS. (Sept.
21, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/car-recalls-defects/car-recall-guide-questions-answered/
(“Tens of millions of cars get recalled each year . . . . Some recalls include millions of vehicles, while
others only include a dozen or so.”); Rebecca Elliott & Ben Foldy, Car-Safety Regulators Urge Tesla
to Recall Around 158,000 Vehicles, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2021, 8:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/car-safety-regulators-urge-tesla-to-recall-around-158-000-vehicles-11610582727 (explaining
a recall request could cost “$300 million to $500 million to address”); Brad Anderson, Ford Reveals
Airbag-Related Recall of 3 Million Vehicles Will Cost It $610 Million, CARSCOOPS (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.carscoops.com/2021/01/ford-reveals-airbag-related-recall-of-3-million-vehicles-willcost-it-610-million.
53.
See infra Part III.
54.
See Best Practices, AUTO-ISAC, https://automotiveisac.com/best-practices (last
accessed Nov. 24, 2021).
55.
Pingol, supra note 18.
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56

vehicles. Due to increasing complexity of the software systems within
vehicles, regulators must consider what consumer protections are necessary
as the maintenance and operation of vehicles are no longer fully in the
hands of riders. The DOT, which includes the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration and NHTSA, must determine how to best oversee OTA
57
software updates with consumer safety in mind.
Over-the-air software updates allow for remote software patches and
feature updates, which present lower costs, increased accessibility for
58
remedies, and more accurate predictions of safety issues. Additionally,
they may “facilitate higher recall completion rates,” as what once required a
trip to the auto shop can now be remedied with either an OTA update
pushed to vehicles over wireless networks or a downloaded solution from a
59
manufacturer’s or NHTSA’s website into the vehicle’s USB port. For
example, “Ford says OTA updates will allow fixes for some recalls and
updates of critical safety systems, repairs that currently require customers to
60
bring their vehicles to a dealership’s service department.” For these
reasons, OTA updates are expected to save global OEMs over $35 billion
61
by 2022. Additionally, it is forecasted that nearly 203 million OTA
enabled vehicles will ship by 2022, making OTA updates a critical aspect of
62
automotive safety.

III. A Push for Over-the-Air Software Updates
In February 2021, Microsoft announced a project with Bosch and
Volkswagen to create a platform to deliver over-the-air software updates to
63
vehicles through Microsoft’s Azure cloud-based computing system.
Microsoft and Bosch hope to make the “installation process of automotive
over-the-air updates a quick and seamless process, no different than

Halder et al., supra note 2, at 5.
See generally ZEV WINKELMAN ET AL., RAND CORP., WHEN AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLES ARE HACKED, WHO IS LIABLE? 67–68 (2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research
_reports/RR2654.html.
58.
Keith Barry, Automakers Embrace Over-the-Air Updates, But Can We Trust Digital Car
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59.
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60.
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Automobile Dealers, WARDS AUTO (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.wardsauto.com/dealers/upsidesand-downside-over-air-software-updates-automobile-dealers.
61.
Halder et al., supra note 2, at 3.
62.
Id. at 2.
63.
Craig Cole, Microsoft and Bosch Join Forces to Create New Automotive Software
Platform, ROAD SHOW BY CNET (Feb. 18, 2021, 9:04 AM), https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news
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64

updating to the latest iOS version on your iPhone.” The duo also plans to
use “GitHub’s enterprise platform and even open-source components of
65
their new software platform for sharing across the motor industry.” This is
a step towards standardization which could lower development costs,
increase transparency, and improve safety by sharing knowledge and
expertise.
Volkswagen is utilizing Microsoft’s cloud to push data and other
mobility services to its vehicles and apps on a platform called the
Volkswagen Automotive Cloud (“VW.AC”), which is currently being tested
66
and is expected to be available to consumers in 2022. Volkswagen hopes
to integrate VW.AC with its new Azure cloud-based machine learning
platform as well, allowing for OTA updates to push new software and
67
autonomous modeling to be shared in the cloud.
Although OTA software updates present the ease of an OTA iOS
update on an iPhone, vehicle updates must be treated with more formality
due to the possibility of safety and security risks to software controlling
engine transmissions, door locking, car horns, braking systems, speed,
68
navigation, and audio or information systems. Greater use of OTA updates
will subject vehicles to cybersecurity risks, and for that reason,
cybersecurity is one of the most pressing issues on the minds of those
69
developing OTA technologies and platforms today.
OEMs have already began demonstrating their commitment to quality
maintenance by OTA software updates thorough meticulous update cycles
that maximize the rigor of safety procedures over a time span of weeks or
months. In 2020, OEMs took 48 days on average to fix and begin
remedying safety recalls, but there are still many cases where the timeline
70
exceeds 3-5 months. But other auto manufacturers working with a business
model closer to that of a software company than an OEM, such as Tesla,
have pushed updates within days of identifying an issue. For example, Tesla
pushed 388 OTA software updates to vehicles over a period of just six
71
years. As explained earlier in this note, in 2018 after Consumer Reports
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reported an “overly long stopping distance for the Model 3” Tesla vehicle,
Tesla pushed an OTA software update only a few days later that “shaved
72
about 20 ft off the Model 3’s braking distance.” The speed of the update
earned Tesla praise from Consumer Reports, but also raised concerns from
some that the update was too rapid to “develop, test, verify, and document
73
such an impactful update on one of the car’s key safety systems.”
While OTA software updates have presented manufacturers a new
opportunity to improve vehicles once out on the road and in a consumer’s
possession, the frequency and quality of updates deserves more attention,
especially as OTA infrastructure rapidly expands in a fragmented fashion.
An OTA software update database maintained by NHTSA could offer a
solution to these problems.

IV. A New Recall Process for Over-the-Air Updates
It is only a matter of time before all auto manufacturers are pushing
OTA software updates to consumers on the road, some of which will offer
new features and others will remedy safety and cybersecurity issues. OTA
software updates will save billions and may even be used to entirely avoid
recalls for what would have been deemed a software related safety defect in
the past.
From 2015 to 2020, NHTSA issued 189 recalls caused by software
74
bugs, resulting in more than 13 million vehicles being physically recalled.
If a different framework existed for remedying software related issues in
vehicles, it is possible that millions of dollars could have been saved from
the recall process by using OTA updates to remedy the issue, along with
expediting the delivery of the remedy.
While it will be important to ensure that safety related software updates
receive thorough development, testing, verification, and documentation, it
will also be important that serious software bugs, whether related to
cybersecurity, automated driver assistance systems, or fully autonomous
driving systems can be updated or recalled immediately upon discovery of a
safety issue. In these situations, NHTSA’s recall process requiring a
manufacturer to notify NHTSA, vehicle or equipment owners, dealers, and
distributors by first-class mail within a reasonable time is out of date and
could potentially lead to fatalities. An OTA Software Update database could
remedy this gap, by notifying consumers, regulators, representatives, and

72.
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74.
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the parking brake software. GM recalled 4.3 million cars due to a software issue that blocked
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other manufacturers while also enabling manufacturers to respond as fast as
possible to the issue.

A. Examples of Software Related Recalls
As aforementioned, many software issues with vehicles do not
75
constitute safety defects, however some issues have been officially
deemed defects by NHTSA.
One safety related software recall in 2021 included almost 1.3 million
vehicles which were found to have a software defect that provided
emergency responders with the incorrect location of the vehicle following a
76
crash, according to a NHTSA investigation. The defect was to be remedied
by either an authorized Mercedes-Benz dealer or an OTA software update
77
of the communication module for the automatic emergency call system.
Mercedes-Benz mailed recall notification letters to owners by April 6, 2021,
78
in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 577.7, notifying all “Mercedes Me”
subscribers that the software update will be performed over-the-air and
notifying other customers that they may opt out of the OTA software update
79
and instead visit an authorized dealer to have the update performed.
In the NHTSA Safety Recall Report regarding the Mercedes-Benz
defect, NHTSA stated that “conditions such as network coverage and
consistency of the data connection” may interfere with the success of
80
completing the OTA software update. This raises a potential issue of
owners of recalled vehicles being uncertain about whether the safety defect
has been resolved in their particular vehicle. Subscribers of the “Mercedes
Me” service “may check the status of the update through the associated
81
website and/or through the Mercedes Me App” under “Software Updates.”
However, owners of recalled vehicles who do not subscribe to “Mercedes
Me” will be unable to know if the software update was successfully
completed without visiting an authorized Mercedes-Benz dealer. An OTA
Software Update database controlled by NHTSA could offer consumers
information about how to check if their vehicle is up to date, decreasing the
number of vehicles operating with outdated software due to connectivity
issues.
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In other cases, an OTA software update will not be the correct remedy
for a software or hardware issue in a vehicle. On January 13, 2021, NHTSA
requested Tesla recall the 2012–2018 Model S and 2016–2018 Model X in a
formal letter stating that the vehicles pose a safety issue due to touchscreen
82
display failure. The agency’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)
determined the displays to be “defective because their computer processors
have a finite number of program-and-erase cycles” which will lead to screen
failure in five to six years, which is not “sufficient for safety-critical
83
features.” The screen failure affects rearview and backup camera images
and defogging and defrosting systems and “may decrease the driver’s
84
visibility in inclement weather.” Tesla confirmed that “all units will
inevitably fail given the memory device’s finite storage capacity,” however,
Tesla said that the “driver can perform a shoulder check and use the
85
mirrors” and also “manually clear the windshield.” In an attempt to fix the
problem, Tesla pushed several OTA software updates; however, “NHTSA
said it tentatively believes the fixes are insufficient” because if the touch
screen displays fail, over-the-air software updates to some functionalities
86
may still be lost. “Accordingly, ODI request[ed] that Tesla initiate a recall
to notify all owners, purchasers, and dealers of the subject vehicles of this
safety defect and provide a remedy, in accordance with the requirements of
87
the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118-30120.”
Tesla owners have received formal recall notices from NHTSA on other
occasions as well, including when an OTA remedy was issued after
88
discovering that a charge plug was causing fires. However, Tesla pushes
many updates outside of the official recall process, many of which are often
largely unannounced, like changing “suspension settings to give the car
89
more clearance at high speeds” to avoid certain collisions. Creating a
mandatory OTA software update database where Tesla would log all of
their system updates would increase transparency and regulatory oversight
as AVs become more common and advanced.
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Finally, in addition to more traditional safety issues like connecting
drivers to emergency responders or visibility of rearview cameras,
cybersecurity software issues are already proving to be a major issue for
manufacturers, regulators, and consumers of vehicles able to receive OTA
software updates. The “first major recall due to a cyber security
90
vulnerability” with vehicle software occurred in 2015. Fiat Chrysler
recalled 1.4 million cars to remedy a defect which allowed for remote
91
hacking of their vehicles. In this case, NHTSA was able to use its
mandatory recall power to address the problem, but cybersecurity risks will
not always fit into the definition of a safety defect and NHTSA will need a
new mechanism to oversee OTA software updates specifically affecting
cybersecurity. Further, because the recall framework is mainly designed to
remedy physical safety defects, cyber issues may slip below NHTSA’s
radar. Based upon the importance of cybersecurity and growing support
from legislators to address cyber issues in vehicles, NHTSA creating an
OTA software update database would help to address concerns.

B. Rulemaking to Address Over-the-Air Software Updates
NHTSA should formally approve OTA software updates as a remedy
for safety defects through the rulemaking process instead of simply
identifying OTA software updates as a remedy in recall reports or broadly in
recommendations. A NHTSA rulemaking process regarding OTA software
updates should be commenced in response to multiple studies demonstrating
a vast increase in software related recalls and growing fragmentation of
OTA update platforms and technologies for vehicles. There are sufficient
incentives to create a structured OTA framework to oversee updates, as the
efficiency, cost, and safety benefits of secure OTA software updates are vast
and will only continue to increase as more connected, automated, and
autonomous vehicles are on the road.
Compatibility is increasingly important as “there are now more than 30
different solutions for OTA updates and remote data gathering among the
92
top 50 Tier 1 suppliers and 30 major OEMs.” Private software companies
are developing platforms which can organize OTA software updates and
93
improve cybersecurity responses, but without an industry standard,
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fragmentation in platform compatibility will continue. Inconsistency
between OS technology and platforms is unsustainable as it increases
“development costs, time to market, and the risk of errors” in software
94
updates, and for that reason, guidelines alone are insufficient. NHTSA
should issue rules deeming OTA software updates as acceptable remedies
and standardizing technologies so that all stakeholders can “benefit from
95
common development and test tools.”
Some manufacturers may be opposed to sharing their regular updates as
it could injure their competitive place in the market. In the rulemaking
process, comments should be requested regarding how sharing information
about operating systems for OTA software updates could potentially harm
competition. Comments should also be requested regarding how greater
transparency in updates could improve safety, trust, and innovation and also
lower development costs for all manufacturers. The rulemaking process
should set a standard for components and OS configurations deemed most
suitable based upon comments submitted by experts. Additionally, the
standard selected should allow for global OEM compatibility.
NHTSA is currently researching the cybersecurity of physical and OTA
96
updates to firmware. Increasing reliance on OTA updates in the future will
pose a hacking risk to a vehicle’s data by installing malware or hacking the
vehicle’s components by disabling a vehicle’s ability to keep software up to
97
date. Some envision that private owners in the future will have the
responsibility to accept “over-the-air updates that maintain cybersecurity of
various components” which will also be shared by “manufacturers who can
98
monitor completion of updates.” However, NHTSA could use the
rulemaking process regarding OTA software updates to require that
cybersecurity updates are automatically adopted by vehicles, unlike
advanced driver-assistance system updates which should require driver
99
approval and training on new features. Regardless of the mechanism
selected for cybersecurity updates, successful updates to software remains
dependent upon consistency of network connection, data connectivity, and
consumer education.
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In order to aid in tracking of whether updates are successfully
completed and to increase transparency in the frequency, type, and quality
of updates, NHTSA should create a new database. This new database would
be similar to NHTSA’s current recall database, but specifically to track
software updates to vehicles on the road. The OTA Software Update
database would ideally log all updates pushed to vehicles, organized by VIN
so that consumers are able to locate their own vehicle and confirm that their
vehicle is up to date. Instead of periodic safety evaluations from
100
manufacturers, as suggested by the Senate Committee Report above, a
database would provide NHTSA with a better view into the frequency and
type of updates being pushed to vehicles. A database for OTA updates
would also increase transparency for consumers and regulators and help
facilitate the sharing of safety related expertise among OTA software
providers and OEMs.
NHTSA rulemaking must also acknowledge that while thoroughness in
development, testing, verification, and documentation of software updates is
essential, some software bugs will need to be fixed immediately and should
not delay notification to first-class mail within a reasonable time, in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 577.7, as any delay in the recall process could
potentially lead to fatalities. The rulemaking should request comments on
the feasibility of carving out an exception in the recall process, specifically
for emergency OTA software updates remedying cybersecurity issues. This
will become increasingly important as cybersecurity risks to vehicles and
safety issues with AV systems become both more complex and opaquer
through machine learning and artificial intelligence.

C. Counter Arguments to Creating an OTA Database
Because regulation in the automotive industry can increase production
costs, it is possible that manufacturers may view NHTSA oversight of OTA
updates as an unwanted cost and risk, especially manufacturers like Tesla
operating more like a software company than a traditional OEM. However,
the automotive industry is changing, and it is reasonable that auto
manufacturer costs may shift as the “deployment of driver assistance
101
An OTA
technologies may result in avoiding crashes altogether.”
Software Update Database could possibly help automotive companies to
comply with the NHTSA recommendations, increase transparency with
consumers, and eliminate formalities of the Safety Act. However, it is
possible that this database could interfere with innovation from
manufacturers.
First, manufacturers sharing details of safety updates to vehicles in an
OTA database could allow competitors to make similar adjustments at a
100.
101.

See Geistfeld, supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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lower cost. This may disincentivize manufacturers from investing in
innovative safety technology if there is potential for the safety updates to be
copied by a competitor. On the other hand, collaboration in safety could
lead to better vehicles and safety standards for all, especially as the
automotive and mobility industries move towards more automated and
autonomous vehicles on the road and the deployment of AI in vehicles.
Details of safety updates pushed to vehicles would likely only identify the
issue resolved, not the actual software code, to ensure the cybersecurity of
connected vehicles and to protect the intellectual property of manufacturers.
Additionally, the organization, accessibility, and security of an OTA
Database may be a challenge, especially because hundreds of updates are
102
being pushed to millions of vehicles every year, a number that will only
increase in future years. Currently NHTSA maintains a database of recalls,
so it is likely that NHTSA would need to redistribute resources or hire new
employees to increase OTA oversight.
It is also possible that NHTSA would resist change to their recall
framework, as it has remained largely unchanged for over 50 years.
NHTSA’ recall process is active and robust as is: “At the close of 2019,
[NHTSA] had 44 open defect investigations (18 Engineering Analyses and
26 Preliminary Evaluations) along with ten investigations into the adequacy
103
of manufacturer recalls.” However, while the recall process under the
Safety Act of 1966 remains active, it is ill fit for the modern vehicles
running on software and using artificial intelligence. For example, “NHTSA
and a manufacturer agreed to a $20 million civil penalty based on the
Agency’s allegations that the manufacturer repeatedly missed reporting
deadlines for various recall reports and related submissions,” including
failing to mail customer notification letters by first class mail within the 60104
days. The high penalty formalities of the Safety Act no longer ensure
compliance, for example when Tesla pushed an OTA update to vehicles
105
prior to mailing any notification letters.
While there may be some obstacles to creating an OTA Software
106
Update Database, if modeled similar to Auto-ISAC and grounded in
protecting the intellectual property of companies and maintaining
cybersecurity, a database has the potential to aid NHTSA in overseeing
OTA software updates pushed to vehicles.
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Conclusion
The automotive industry is rapidly evolving, and now is the time for
NHTSA to adapt its recall process for OTA software updates and
cybersecurity issues. “The global automotive cybersecurity market is
expected to grow at an unprecedented rate, from $1.34 billion in 2018 to
107
$5.77 billion by 2025.” OTA updates are expected to save global OEMs
108
over $35 billion by 2022. The future of automotive recalls will occur
over-the-air, replacing the tire and air bag recalls of the past. While the
physical vehicle will remain important, the software within vehicles will
rise to greater importance with cybersecurity vulnerabilities as a growing
threat. NHTSA is already operating a recall framework that is outdated, and
without evolution, it will become obsolete.
As vehicles become smarter and more connected, their software
becomes more complex and requires regular updates. OTA software updates
are an efficient, cost-effective way to keep modern vehicle software up to
date. However, due to the often opaque nature of software and operating
systems, there is a lack of transparency for consumers and regulators
regarding the process of updating software in vehicles. Additionally, as
OEMs and private software distributors work separately to create their own
OTA platforms, the technologies are growing increasingly fragmented,
resulting in incompatibilities. For these reasons, and to prioritize the most
efficient responses to safety issues in a world of increasingly complex
vehicles, NHTSA should commence a rulemaking proceeding regarding
OTA software updates in order to officially approve the process as a remedy
for recalls, set standards for OTA operating systems and components to
improve compatibility among global OEMs, and to create an organized,
accessible database of OTA software updates which will result in increased
transparency for consumers, regulators, and manufacturers.
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